This paper examines needed adaptations of our nuclear and nonnuclear strategy. In particular, it considers the impact of changes in the threat and changes in technology. Emphasis is placed on the increasing need for improved conventional capability. This imposes much more severe requirements to achieve an adequate capability to protect many places of critical interests to the West--places we once regarded as facing only "low to moderate" threats. It also presents new opportunities for a Soviet strategy and tactics that can divide the allies and neutralize them selectively. Such a strategy would exploit the Soviets' increased ability to isolate and to coerce or 4 . J J attack one of the Western allies and, at the same time, to give other allies the opportunity to opt out while holding them under threat.
The very large increase in the Soviet ability to project power near their periphery has potentially decisive importance because several of these areas are vital for the U.S. and its major allies and they are much more accessible to the Soviets than they are to the West. The
Soviets have also substantially increased their ability to project military strength at very great distances--as they illustrated most spectacularly in Angola. And both in distant places and near their periphery, they have developed the use of proxies for their own intervention. These areas distant from their borders are, in general, less critical for the major Western allies and, in many cases, the West has better access than the Soviets or is at least at a smaller relative disadvantage than in places close to the Soviet periphery. Nonetheless, conflicts in these remote areas may have a substantial affect on Western interests even when they are not decisive. While lower in priority, they have to be taken into account.
C. New Stratezy
The Administration strategy for meeting several widely separated but potentially lethal threats to the alliance recognizes that these cannot be met by technical means alone. The threats will, for example, require new forms of cooperation between land-based airborne warning, No budget level likely to be available to us and our allies will A enable us to meet this increased threat merely by multiplying the number or increasing the complexity of our already costly manned combat platforms. These platforms will continue to play a vital role. However, the thrust of the new technologies, now emerging, is will be important that many of these technologies find their way into allied forces. Especially, in the case of poor allied countries which need security assistance, the possibility of putting smart missiles and warheads on simpler aircraft, designing smart modern rounds for older barrels and the like, needs vigorously to be pursued. Moreover, to a substantial extent, these revolutionary non-nuclear technologies are becoming available to the small powers engaged as principals in these remote conflicts. The changes are likely to be 9.
revolutionary for them as well as for the Soviet-Union and the NATO powers.
It is hard to believe that such revolutio~ary changes have been adequately reflected in the organization of our bureaucracies, in our procurement programs, in our negotiations with adversaries, or in our strategy. To take one important example embedded in all four, the distinction between strategic forces and theatre or strike forces has little residual relevance. Theater co anders will need precise, nonnuclear ordnance capable of attacking targets on land while keeping the 1 m11 most expensive platforms out of the way of high-performance Soviet offense and defense. The new technologies will make such extended range missiles increasingly available. This raises problems for bureaucracies about "gray areas" but it offers bright prospects of new sorts of tradeoffs and complementarities capable of radically improving both nonnuclear and nuclear missions.
F. Budaet. Arms Agreements. Etc
Decisions at the margin need to emphasize allocation to improve "munitions": that is, the missiles and warheads launched from manned -' combat platforms. Otherwise, pressures to cut the budget may result in cuts in just the wrong places--namely, damaging cuts in the smart subsystems launched from combat platforms which can make order of magnitude differences in effectiveness, rather than in the number of plat-* forms themselves; and also damaging cuts or stretchouts in some of the systems required to inform both the manned combat platforms and the unmanned subsystems launched from such platforms by gathering information and analyzing it before the outbreak of war as well as those which can direct fire during wartime.
We tend to associate "modernization," or long-run increases in effectiveness, with research and development on large combat platforms and on their acquisition. And we usually think of the ordnance launched from these platforms as affecting only, or mainly, our readiness to fight and to sustain a fight, at the present level of effectiveness,in case war should break out in the near future. But this is wrong.
Improvements in smart ordnance are a key part of the process of moderni-
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* ~-v.~*.' ~Jill~ zation today. Deferring the acquisition of such munitions then not only can lower dangerously our readiness, it can mean sacrificing essential increases in effectiveness. We miss this point, in part, because of the bad habit of talking about the military balance with adversaries almost exclusively in terms of large platforms. That habit is endemic especially to debates on arms negotiations and accounts in part for their perverse focus on symbols rather than substance.
The pressure for a nuclear freeze and for nuclear arms agreements with the Soviets could have perverse effects on the overt purposes of such freezes and agreements: namely to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and to reduce their number. Any vehicle that can deliver a thousand or two thousand pound non-nuclear warhead, from an extended range, with precision enough to destroy a target, can surely deliver effectively a smaller, much lighter weight nuclear warhead at even greater range. Any agreement, therefore, to stop or reduce all systems, or all systems of a given type, which are capable of delivering nuclear warheads, would stop the introduction of the conventional systems that might increasingly replace nuclear warheads; and so prevent the reduced numbers of nuclear weapons and the reduced reliance on them which the agreement appears to seek. The original protocol, now expired, to SALT II, suggests that our negotiators will need to keep in mind Florence Nightingale's maxim: '"hatever else hospitals do, they shouldn't spread disease." 
